Israeli Researcher Warns: Gaza’s ‘Hell War Plan’ Poses a Threat to Tel Aviv and Could Lead to Army Disintegration

In an article published by the Hebrew newspaper Haaretz, Shelah notes that Eyal Zamir is expected to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant general next month and assume his position as the 24th Chief of Staff of the Israeli army.

He is likely to receive orders from the political leadership in his early days in office regarding a military operation against Gaza, which, according to Defense Minister Yisrael Katz, will “open the gates of hell on Hamas.” Shelah suggests that this new war on Gaza will be different in intensity from previous ones before the ceasefire.

Shelah argues that Katz may have wanted to present his own version of former U.S. President Donald Trump’s rhetoric, but Zamir will get a firsthand view of what “hell” will look like during his first visit to the Southern Command, which he previously led.

Shelah continues: “Military analyst Amos Harel (Haaretz, 14/2) has already revealed part of it: imposing a blockade, harming humanitarian aid, and causing massive destruction to the environment. One of the objectives is to create an unbearable situation that forces Palestinians to migrate from Gaza, aligning with Trump’s vision of ‘cleansing’ the Strip of Palestinians and rebuilding it in the style of the ‘Mar-a-Lago’ resort (Trump’s Florida property since 1985) on the Mediterranean coast. On the way to that goal, whether intentionally or not, the inevitable result will be mass killing of civilians, including women and children. This is true hell.”

Shelah had previously warned at the start of the war that it would fail to achieve its objectives, particularly because those objectives were overly ambitious, and that Israel was relying solely on force without providing an alternative to Hamas.

He argues that the Israeli army’s Southern Command is planning a campaign of killing and revenge, one that, according to Harel, “reeks of ethnic cleansing.”

He continues: “This already happened last October, during the operation in Jabalia and Beit Hanoun, planned by officers in the Southern Command and approved by the ‘Knights of October 7’—outgoing Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Southern Command chief Yaron Finkelman, and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. With their incompetence and lack of professionalism, they handed Netanyahu everything he could have wished for on a silver platter: extending the war with the approval of the ‘professionals,’ turning Israel into a military state driven by unchecked revenge.”

However, Shelah argues that looking back at past decisions is less important now than deciding the future. Before Zamir even takes office, he must address a dilemma no previous Chief of Staff has faced. Shelah warns that the “Hell Plan” will be executed by soldiers, field commanders, intelligence officers, and pilots—each with a conscience, but bound by orders. He adds: “Anyone who refuses to obey will face consequences, knowing that their sacrifice won’t stop the operation. But there is one person who, by saying ‘no,’ could halt this horrifying scenario, save the army, and protect those serving in it: the Chief of Staff, the highest-ranking officer in the military.”

Shelah warns of potential legal consequences, referencing Israel’s Basic Law, which states that the army and its Chief of Staff are subordinate to the government and the defense minister. However, in practice, the Chief of Staff plays a crucial role beyond simply executing orders, as he leads an institution that enjoys the highest level of public trust and operates in a political environment lacking expertise. Zamir, Shelah argues, must do everything in his power to prevent the plan from being implemented.

He further states that Zamir must make it clear to the defense minister and the prime minister that the orders being imposed on the army—resembling the actions of criminal gangs—will face opposition from him, as he is responsible for the moral damage to tens of thousands of soldiers and the ethical collapse of the so-called “people’s army,” which could lead to its disintegration.

Shelah also references Colonel Eli Geva, who tried to prevent the Israeli army from entering Beirut in 1982 and was subsequently dismissed. Geva wrote, 20 years after the First Lebanon War, that “in most cases, positions, orders, and decisions are legal in the strict and literal sense. But the problem is that their implementation leads to actions that push them into illegality, to the extent that a gray and black flag begins to hover over them.”

Shelah concludes: “In the case of the Hell War in Gaza, the black flag is already flying. Israeli public opinion—driven by grief, fear, and a desire for revenge—is waving it as if it were the banner of our time. It is fueled by an unrestrained political leadership motivated by survival instincts. There is no opposition. There is no media oversight. Only Eyal Zamir can stop this—and it is his duty to do so.”